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CONTEXT IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: ESTABLISHMENT




For years, the United States has been engaged in "a vigorous national
debate over religion's role in government."' That debate is now at the fore-
front of our legal system as the United States Supreme Court prepares to
rule on the constitutionality of displays of the Ten Commandments on gov-
ernmental property.2 It has been twenty-five years since the Court last con-
sidered whether public postings of the Ten Commandments violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 3 Today, the Supreme Court
is on the brink of two legal decisions that will impact the entire nation and
that likely will overturn the decisions of several United States Courts of
Appeals.4
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2005; B.A.,
History, University of Michigan, 2002. The author would like to thank Professor Mark Rosen for his
valuable critiques and guidance in the writing of this Note and Professor Richard Wright for his insight
into tort law's reasonable person.
1. Joan Biskupic, Commandments Cases May Hinge on One High Court Justice, USA TODAY,
Mar. 3, 2005, at 2A.
2. See id.; Charles Lane, Division of Church, State at High Court; Ten Commandments Displays
on Government Land at Issue, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2005, at A3.
3. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Joan Biskupic, Court Enters Debate over Display of
Commandments, USA TODAY, Mar. 2,2005, at 1A-2A.
4. There is currently a circuit split amongst the appellate courts regarding the constitutionality of
Ten Commandments displays. Depending on how the Supreme Court rules, case law in some circuits
may be overturned. See, e.g., Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397, 399 (3rd Cir. 2004)
(holding that a plaque of the Ten Commandments affixed to a county courthouse did not violate the
Establishment Clause because of the age and historical importance of the plaque); Van Orden v. Perry,
351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that a Ten Commandments monument near the state Capitol
Building does not violate the Establishment Clause because of the context in which it appears), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004). But see ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020,
1039 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a Ten Commandments monument displayed in a public park violated
the Establishment Clause because it failed the purpose prong of the Lemon test); Glassroth v. Moore,
335 F.3d 1282, 1296-97 (11 th Cir. 2003) (finding that the placement of a monument of the Ten Com-
mandments in the rotunda of a state courthouse violated the Establishment Clause because it was con-
trary to the purpose prong of the Lemon test), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003); ACLU of Ky. v.
McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 440 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming an injunction issued by a district court
that ordered three separate displays of the Ten Commandments to be removed), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
310 (2004); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cit. 2000) (holding that a monument
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The Establishment Clause prohibits any law "respecting an establish-
ment of religion." 5 The Fourteenth Amendment arguably makes the Estab-
lishment Clause binding on the states, 6 and the Supreme Court has
frequently adjudicated cases where state governmental agencies have alleg-
edly violated the Establishment Clause.
7
The proper analysis to determine such Establishment Clause violations
is a point of contention in the federal courts. 8 The officially accepted Su-
preme Court test was developed in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman and is typi-
cally referred to as "the Lemon test." 9 However, Justice O'Connor later
offered a clarification in her concurring opinion in the 1984 case, Lynch v.
Donnelly.I0 This clarification created what is popularly known as the "en-
dorsement test.""l The result of Justice O'Connor's clarification has been
uncertainty and disagreement over the appropriate standard for analyzing
purported Establishment Clause violations.
With the issue now before the Supreme Court, commentators expect
that the Court will rule on the appropriate method for interpreting Estab-
lishment Clause violations as the alleged violations relate to displays of the
located in front of the city Municipal Building that displays the Ten Commandments is violative of the
Establishment Clause).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pmette, 515 U.S. 753, 757, 770 (1995) (holding
that a state does not violate the establishment clause when it permits a private party to display a reli-
gious symbol in a traditional public setting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chap-
ter, 492 U.S. 573, 578-79, 620 (1989) (deciding that a creche holiday display is unconstitutional
because it violates the Establishment Clause, while a menorah holiday display does not violate the First
Amendment because it appears next to a Christmas tree and a liberty sign); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 40, 61 (1985) (finding that an Alabama statute authorizing a period of silence "for meditation or
voluntary prayer" violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670-71, 687 (1984) (holding that a mu-
nicipality's annual Christmas display, which includes a creche, does not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment); Stone, 449 U.S. at 39, 42-43 (concluding that a Kentucky statute
requiring that copies of the Ten Commandments be posted in public school classrooms violates the
Establishment Clause); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971) (holding that state statutes in
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that provide state aid to church-related schools are unconstitutional).
8. See Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion
Clauses, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 323, 359-66. Greenawalt discusses how the Supreme Court's Lemon test
has been more or less abandoned and how there is disagreement amongst the Supreme Court Justices
over exactly how the analysis should now work. Id.
9. 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Lemon test requires that the statute have a "secular legislative pur-
pose," that its primary effect "neither advances nor inhibits religion," and that it does not "foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion." Id.
10. 465 U.S. at 690-92. Justice O'Connor suggested a clarification to the Lemon test that col-
lapsed the purpose and effects prongs of Lemon into one. The real question, according to Justice
O'Connor, was whether an objective observer would perceive a challenged governmental action as
endorsing religion. id.
11. Id.; see, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REv. 1363, 1372 (2000); Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 324.
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Ten Commandments. To make this ruling, the Court will most likely en-
gage in an analysis of the reasonable observer who is viewing a Ten Com-
mandments display. A reasonable observer analysis was part of both
appellate court decisions now on certiorari, and the arguments now before
the Court each discussed the role of the reasonable observer.12 However,
one of the crucial cases in the reasonable observer debate is not one being
argued before the Court. In Freethought Society v. Chester County, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the constitutionality of a Ten
Commandments display after considering whether a reasonable observer
would view the display as a governmental endorsement of religion. 13 Al-
though the plaintiff in that case did not appeal to the Supreme Court, the
Third Circuit's decision is cited in both cases now before the Court, once in
the Fifth Circuit's majority opinion, and once in the Sixth Circuit's dis-
sent. 14 A proper understanding of the Third Circuit's holding is crucial
because the holding was based on the perceptions of the "reasonable ob-
server," and a reasonable observer analysis is likely to be part of the Su-
preme Court's ruling.
In Freethought, the Third Circuit concluded that displaying a plaque
of the Ten Commandments in the Chester County Courthouse was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause. 15 The court stated that the appropri-
ate question to ask in determining whether displaying the plaque violated
the Establishment Clause was whether a "reasonable observer would per-
ceive the display as a government endorsement of religion."' 16 However,
this Note argues that the reasonable person standard used by the Third Cir-
cuit really is a more-than-reasonable person standard. 17 The more-than-
reasonable person is a heightened standard, originally developed by Justice
12. See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing the perceptions of the
reasonable observer), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004); ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d
438, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) ("A reasonable observer of the displays cannot connect the Ten Command-
ments with a unifying historical or cultural theme that is also secular."), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 310
(2004); see also Brief for Petitioner at 9, Van Orden (No. 03-1500) ("The reasonable observer would
surely see the Ten Commandments monument as the government endorsing religion because of its
placement, its context, and its content-") (emphasis in original); Respondents' Brief at 9, Van Orden
(No. 03-1500) ("[T]he reasonable observer would not conclude that the Ten Commandments monument
on the Texas Capitol Grounds conveys a message of religious endorsement."); Brief for Petitioners at 6,
McCreary County (No. 03-1693) ("No reasonable observer would consider the Foundations Display an
endorsement of religion."); Brief for Respondents at 9, McCreary County (No. 03-1693) ("The dis-
plays' content, context, and location all lead the reasonable observer to view them as symbolically
endorsing religion.").
13. 334 F.3d 247, 251, 270 (3rd Cir. 2003).
14. See McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 471 (Ryan, J., dissenting); Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 182.
15. Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 270.
16. Id. at 258.
17 Id. at 259 (adopting Justice O'Connor's reasonable person standard, requiring the objective
observer to know the age and history of the plaque).
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O'Connor in Wallace v. Jaffree.18 The use of this standard enabled the
Third Circuit to conclude that displaying a plaque of the Ten Command-
ments-an inherently religious text-did not -constitute governmental en-
dorsement of religion. 19
If the Third Circuit had used a normal reasonable person analysis, and
if it had consistently analyzed the Freethought case through the lens of an
objective observer, it likely would have concluded that the Ten Com-
mandments plaque was a governmental endorsement of religion. After all,
there have been numerous other cases in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence concluding that displays of the Ten Commandments constitute an
improper governmental endorsement of religion. 20
This Note will analyze the Third Circuit's application of Justice
O'Connor's more-than-reasonable person standard in Freethought Society
v. Chester County and will explain why that standard should not become
the accepted method of analysis in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Part I will explain the Supreme Court's three-part Lemon test, as well as the
subsequent clarification to the test proposed by Justice O'Connor. It will
also look at Justice O'Connor's adoption of the more-than-reasonable per-
son as the objective observer. Finally, it will explain how the endorsement
test has since been incorporated into the Supreme Court's analysis of Es-
tablishment Clause violations.
Part II will present the Third Circuit's decision in Freethought Society
v. Chester County, highlighting the court's use of both the Lemon test and
the endorsement test in reaching its conclusion. This section will look at the
relevant facts and the lower court's decision before discussing the Third
Circuit's analysis.21 It will pay specific attention to the court's use of the
more-than-reasonable person as its objective observer and to the court's
18. 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Here, Justice O'Connor stated
that the relevant issue in the case was whether an "objective observer, acquainted with the text, legisla-
tive history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in
public schools." Id.
19. Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 270.
20. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (holding that postings of the Ten
Conmandments on walls of public schools violates the Establishment Clause); Glassroth v. Moore, 335
F.3d 1282, 1284 (11 th Cir. 2003) (ordering that a monument of the Ten Commandments must be re-
moved from the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building because it was a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 474-75 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding that a display of the Ten Commandments on the State Capitol grounds would be consid-
ered an endorsement of religion and therefore would be unconstitutional); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235
F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a monument located in front of the city Municipal Building
that displayed the Ten Commandments violates the Establishment Clause).
21. A detailed factual analysis is crucial in cases involving potential Establishment Clause viola-
tions because the context of a Ten Commandments display can alter its effects. See County of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 596-97 (1989).
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application of the subjective observer in the effects prong of the Lemon
test.
Part III will examine the reasonable person, as it is defined in tort law,
and will compare it to Justice O'Connor's more-than-reasonable person.
Tort law's reasonable person definition will be used as the proper lens of
analysis because it is from tort law that Justice O'Connor contends she
draws the criteria of her "reasonable person." 22 This section will also ex-
plain the flaws in Justice O'Connor's analysis, showing how she has misin-
terpreted the tort law standard of the reasonable person, thus making it
harder to prove an Establishment Clause violation.
Part IV will scrutinize the Third Circuit's decision and will discredit
Justice O'Connor's more-than-reasonable person, suggesting instead that a
true reasonable person standard should be applied when using either the
Lemon test or the endorsement test. It will explain that the common flaw in
both tests is the application of this more-than-reasonable person as the ob-
jective observer, and it will demonstrate how Freethought Society v. Ches-
ter County is an example of a court reaching an erroneous conclusion
because of this analysis.
Finally, Part V will consider the potential effects that the Third Cir-
cuit's decision may have on the outcome of the imminent Supreme Court
ruling if the Court were to follow in the direction of Freethought and were
to apply a more-than-reasonable person standard. It will briefly examine
the two appellate court cases now on certiorari that reference the Free-
thought case and will explain why the Third Circuit's erroneous ruling
could negatively impact the Supreme Court's holding in the two cases now
before the Court.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE-FROM LEMON TO ENDORSEMENT
A. Lemon v. Kurtzman's Three-Prong Test for Determining Establish-
ment Clause Violations
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court established a three-prong
test for determining whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment had been violated. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, two state statutes providing
for state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools were ques-
22, See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citing W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)).
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tioned as violative of the Establishment Clause. 23 The test developed by the
Supreme Court for analyzing the existence of a violation was the Lemon
test, which asked: (1) whether the challenged law or conduct had a secular
legislative purpose, (2) whether the principal or primary effect of the chal-
lenged law either advanced or inhibited any religion, and (3) whether the
challenged law created an excessive entanglement between government
and religion. 24 The first prong of Lemon, commonly referred to as the pur-
pose prong, requires courts to determine whether the stated secular purpose
for a religious display is sincere and is not a "sham" offered by the gov-
ernment to cover a religious purpose. 25 Yet, in most instances, the Court
will defer to the government's stated intention for a display.26 Lemon's
second prong-the effects prong-requires the court to consider the "total-
ity of circumstances" surrounding a religious display in order to determine
whether a reasonable person would believe that the display constituted a
governmental endorsement of religion.27 The third prong in the Lemon test
looks to see whether there has been an excessive entanglement between
government and religion.
28
B. Clarifying Lemon-Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test
In a 1984 concurring opinion to the decision in Lynch v. Donnelly,
Justice O'Connor offered what she called a clarification to the then-current
Establishment Clause doctrine.29 She stated that there were two primary
ways in which the government could violate the Establishment Clause:
"excessive entanglement with religious institutions" and "government en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion."'30 She saw this second violation as
the more direct of the two, explaining that "[e]ndorsement sends a message
23. 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971).
24. Id. at 612-13. The Supreme Court subsequently stated that if a statute violates any of the three
Lemon principles, it must be struck down as a breach of the Establishment Clause. See Stone, 449 U.S.
at 40-4 1.
25. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)) (adopting Justice O'Connor's position that
legislatures may sometimes enunciate sham secular purposes in order that their statutes or actions will
pass constitutional scrutiny under the Establishment Clause).
26. Id. ("When a governmental entity professes a secular purpose for an arguably religious policy,
the government's characterization is, of course, entitled to some deference.").
27. Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 304 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) ("[T]he government's use of religious
symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the
government's use of religious symbolism depends upon its context.")).
28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
29. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 687-88.
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to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insid-
ers, favored members of the political community." 31 Justice O'Connor
focused on both the government's intention and on the "objective meaning
of the statement in the community. '32 The endorsement test thus states that
the effect of a religious display is determined by the message that the gov-
ernment's action communicates-what viewers of the display may rea-
sonably understand its purpose to be. 33 This understanding is dependent on
the context in which the display appears.
34
Justice O'Connor later defined the objective observer of her endorse-
ment test as an individual who is aware of the history of (1) the religious
display, (2) the context in which it appears, and (3) the reasons for the gov-
ernmental placement or implementation. 35 She explained that the objective
observer should possess this higher level of knowledge because an en-
dorsement inquiry should not be based on the subjective perspective of
isolated nonadherents who are uncomfortable with a religious display.
36
Instead, the applicable observer should be comparable to "a personification
of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, '37 whom Justice O'Connor
equates to the reasonable person as defined in tort law. 38 She saw this ideal
person as an individual with knowledge of the history and context of a
religious display.
39
C. After Endorsement-A Lack of Uniformity
After Justice O'Connor's development of the endorsement test in
Lynch, the Supreme Court has gradually incorporated an endorsement
analysis into its decisions in Establishment Clause cases. 40 Use of the tradi-
31. Id. at 688.
32. Id. at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989)
(explaining Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis).
34. Id.
35. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd- v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-81 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (explaining why she uses the more-than-
reasonable person); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(defining her "reasonable person").
36. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment).
37 Id. at 780 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 175).
38. Id. at 779-80. Justice O'Connor is incorrect in her comparison to the law of torts, because the
law of torts actually runs counter to the sort of reasonable person that Justice O'Connor has created. See
infra Part Ill for further explanation.
39. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment).
40. Adler, supra note 11, at 1372.
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tional version of the Lemon test seems to have vanished, 4 1 and in its place
is a hybrid of Lemon and endorsement, constantly being molded to fit the
facts of a particular case. Thus, although Lemon has yet to be overturned,
the Supreme Court now appears to incorporate an endorsement test analysis
into Establishment Clause cases, asking whether a challenged display or
action will likely be perceived by adherents as governmental endorsement
of religion or by nonadherents as governmental disapproval of their reli-
gious choices. 42 This incorporation is found in the effects prong of the
Lemon test, which the Court now sees as asking whether governmental use
of religious symbols has the effect of endorsing religion.43 The Court
makes this determination based on a reasonable person's interpretation of
the context in which a religious symbol appears.44
II. FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY V. CHESTER COUNTY AND THE MORE-THAN-
REASONABLE PERSON
A. Factual Background
At a dedication ceremony in December of 1920, a plaque displaying a
Protestant version of the Ten Commandments was placed on the east fa-
gade of the Chester County Courthouse in West Chester, Pennsylvania.
4 5
The Religious Education Council of Chester County requested permission
to erect this bronze plaque, and the County Commissioners accepted the
donation to the Courthouse.46 All known members of the Religious Educa-
tion Council were clergy or laymen of Protestant denominations. 47 The
dedication ceremony consisted of hymns being sung and a prayer of dedi-
cation.4 8 The ceremony stressed both the religious and secular significance
of the Ten Commandments.49 The plaque, positioned near the entrance to
the Courthouse, remains in place eight decades later.
50
The plaque itself contains a text of the Ten Commandments from the
King James Version of the Bible. Today, over 250,000 people visit the
41. Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 359.
42. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F,3d 247, 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2003).
46. Id.
47. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 191 F. Supp. 2d 589, 590 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
48. Id.
49. FreethoughtSoc'y, 334 F.3d at 251.
50. Id. at 249-50.
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Chester County Courthouse every year, and, until 2001, everyone entering
the building walked past the Ten Commandments plaque on their way in-
side. 51 However, the main entrance to the Courthouse was relocated in
2001 for security reasons, so now only the title of the plaque-"The Com-
mandments"-is legible to a passerby.
52
The Chester County Courthouse is itself historically significant. The
Courthouse was built in 1846 and was later placed on the National Register
of Historic Places. 53 However, when the application for this designation
was submitted, there was no mention of the Ten Commandments plaque.
54
Although the age of the plaque is not obvious by observation alone, the
plaque does appear to be older than other administrative signs on the
building.
55
Since the plaque's erection in 1920, Chester County has done nothing
to draw attention to the plaque, to celebrate it, or to maintain it.56 The
plaque did not receive any direct attention at all until 2001, when legal
counsel for a member of the community requested that it be taken down.
57
Sally Flynn is a member of the Freethought Society of Greater Philadel-
phia-an organization comprised of atheists, agnostics, and other "free-
thinkers." 58 She commenced action in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania after Chester County refused to remove the plaque
on her request.59 Ms. Flynn finds the plaque offensive and often takes steps
to avoid seeing it.60 She has been aware of the plaque's presence since
1960, but she did not become an atheist until 1996.61
Ms. Flynn primarily argued that the effect of the Ten Commandments
plaque was to cause a reasonable observer to believe that Chester County
was endorsing religion.62 She argued that because the plaque was donated
by the Religious Education Council for religious purposes and was ac-
cepted by the County, its presence violated the Establishment Clause.63 The
defendants contended that the focus in the case should be on the 2001 ac-
51. Id. at 250, 252.
52. Id. at 253.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 254.
56. Id. at 251.
57. Id. at 255.
58. Id. at 254.
59. Id. at 255.
60. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 191 F. Supp. 2d 589, 593 (ED Pa. 2002).
61. FreethoughtSocy, 334 F.3d at 254.
62. Id. at 250.
63. Id.
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tion of the County Commissioners. 64 Also, the defendants maintained that
because of the plaque's long history, the reasonable observer would not see
it as an endorsement of religion.
65
In an evidentiary hearing, the current Chester County Commissioners
explained their belief that the plaque has a secular purpose because of its
dual nature. 66 One Commissioner testified that he felt the Ten Command-
ments "symbolize[d] civilization," while a second Commissioner defended
the plaque as symbolic of the "two wing theory of our polity. '67
B. The Decision of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held the
Ten Commandments plaque to be unconstitutional, violating the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment. 68 The court stated that Chester
County's acceptance of the plaque in 1920 constituted a governmental
abandonment of neutrality and an intent to promote a particular religious
view.69 It gave no weight to the views of the current Chester County Com-
missioners, reasoning that the crucial issue was instead the government's
purpose at the time of the pertinent action-the 1920 acceptance and erec-
tion of the plaque. 70 The court further concluded that the plaque's effect, of
endorsing the importance of a predominantly religious text from a Protes-
tant interpretation, runs afoul of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 71
C. The Decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Third Circuit saw two issues that needed to be decided:
first, what were the correct principles of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence that should be used in deciding the case, and second, should the fo-
cus of the court's analysis be on the 1920 erection of the plaque or the 2001
refusal by the County Commissioners to remove it?72 The court concluded
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 191 F. Supp. 2d 589, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2002). The plaque's
dual nature refers to its religious and secular purposes. Id.
67. Id. at 597-98, The second commissioner continued on to explain that this "two wing theory of
our polity" was one where "faith and reason ... as a historical reality worked together to create and
maintain the American experiment." Id. at 598.
68. Id. at 600-01.
69. Id. at 597.
70. Id. at 598.
71. Id. at 599.
72. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2003).
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that the relevant inquiry comes from Justice O'Connor's endorsement test,
asking "whether a reasonable observer would perceive the display as a
government endorsement of religion."'73 The Third Circuit also decided that
the focus of its inquiry should be on the County Commissioners' inaction
in 2001 and not the action of the Commissioners in 1920.
74
1. The Correct Establishment Clause Framework
Because of the extensive criticism the Lemon test has received in re-
cent years, 75 the Third Circuit held that the correct analysis in religious
display cases comes from Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. The court
explained that this approach collapses the purpose and effects prongs of
Lemon into a single inquiry and asks whether a reasonable observer-one
familiar with the history and context of the display-would find the chal-
lenged governmental action to be an endorsement of religion.
76
Although the Third Circuit held that the correct Establishment Clause
framework was Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, it nevertheless also
evaluated the case using Lemon. The court saw the key difference between
the Lemon test and the endorsement test to be the purpose prong of Lemon,
reasoning that the effects prong is coequal to an endorsement test analysis,
both of which focus on the perceptions of the reasonable observer. 77 Under
the purpose prong of the Lemon test, a legitimate secular purpose is also
required. 7
8
2. The Proper Time Frame
The County Commissioners' actions are relevant when analyzing the
Lemon test's purpose prong. The outcome of this analysis changes, depend-
ing on whether the focus is placed on the 1920 Commissioners' purpose for
erecting the plaque or on the 2001 Commissioners' purpose for refusing to
remove it. In determining the County's purpose, the Third Circuit held that
an inquiry should not only be made into the original motivation for display-
ing the plaque, but should also be made regarding the Commissioners'
73. Id. at 258.
74. Id. at 251.
75. See Freethought Soc y, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (describing the opinions of the four Supreme
Court Justices who have criticized Lemon in recent years).
76. Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 250.
77. Id. at 250-51.
78. Id. at 251.
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reasons for leaving the plaque in place in 2001. 79 It reasoned that focusing
on the events of 2001, as opposed to the events of 1920, was consistent
with its view of the endorsement test, which considers the reasonable ob-
server's perception of the plaque today. 80
The court primarily focused on the events of 2001 because this time
frame was the context in which the court's reasonable observer would view
the plaque. The reasonable observer, aware of the age and history of the
plaque, would feel its effects in the present day, and the court reasoned that
it would not make sense to consider this present day effect while only ana-
lyzing the original 1920 purpose for the plaque's erection.81 It is more logi-
cal to consider the present day purpose for keeping the plaque in place
when considering the present day effect that the plaque has on observers.
3. Applying Endorsement and Lemon
In its application of the endorsement test, the Third Circuit conceded
that the Ten Commandments possess an "inherently religious message. '8 2
However, the court looked to Supreme Court precedent, where the context
of an otherwise religious display can affect the display's overall message
and can affect whether the display is seen as an endorsement of religion.83
Here, the age and history of the plaque create a context that changes its
effect.84
The key point for the court hinged on whether a passerby who walked
up the steps of the Courthouse to read the text of the Ten Commandments
would reasonably believe that by declining to remove this plaque, the
County was endorsing religion.85 The court held that a "reasonable ob-
server" of the Ten Commandments plaque was an individual aware of the
history of the plaque and of Chester County.86 This reasonable observer
was presumed to know the history of the Chester County Courthouse; he or
she was also presumed to know that the County has not held any sort of
79. Id. at 261-62; see also Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 304 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that the court must assess the "totality of circumstances" surrounding a display when determining
whether a reasonable person would perceive it as an endorsement of religion).
80. FreethoughtSoc'y, 334 F.3d at 262.
81. Id.
82- Id.
83. Id. at 263 (referencing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (finding a religious creche was not an endorsement of religion when viewed in the context of the
entire display)).
84- Id. at 264.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 265 (adopting Justice O'Connor's more-than-reasonable person standard for applying
the endorsement test).
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ceremony to commemorate the plaque during its eighty-year span.8 7 And
because of this knowledge of the plaque's context, the reasonable observer
would not see the plaque as a governmental endorsement of religion, but
would instead consider the plaque to be part of a historic monument.
88
Under its Lemon test analysis, the Third Circuit disregarded the dis-
trict court's focus on Chester County's original purpose for accepting the
plaque. 89 The court instead gave considerable deference to the County,
believing that the Commissioners had professed a "non-sham" secular pur-
pose in their refusal to remove the plaque.90 The effects prong of Lemon-
identical to an endorsement test analysis-also passed constitutional muster
for the same reasons the endorsement test succeeded. 91
4. A Subjective Secular Purpose
Although the Third Circuit had little difficulty concluding that dis-
playing the Ten Commandments plaque on the Chester County Courthouse
was not a governmental endorsement of religion, it did not take into con-
sideration whether an objective reasonable observer would believe the
plaque had a secular purpose. 92 The court deferred to the testimony of the
Chester County Commissioners, who said that the secular purpose of the
plaque was that the Ten Commandments formed the basis of much of
American law and polity. 93 The court relied on a subjective inquiry into the
Commissioners' purpose. 94 No objective inquiry was made into whether a
reasonable observer would perceive the plaque as the celebration of a foun-
dational legal document. The court conceded that it did not consider any
objective perspective when questioning the existence of a secular
purpose.95
87. Id. at 266.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 267. The district court noted that the views of the current County Commissioners were
of little, if any, value in evaluating the original purpose of the County in erecting the plaque. Free-
thought Soc'y v. Chester County, 191 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
90. Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 267.
91. Id. at 269.
92. Id. at 268.
93. Id. at 267.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 268.
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III. WHOSE PERCEPTIONS SHOULD CONTROL? OBJECTIVE VERSUS
SUBJECTIVE, AND REASONABLE VERSUS MORE-THAN-REASONABLE
Since the inception of the endorsement test, a central question of en-
dorsement analysis has emerged: whose perceptions should control?
96
Should the court look to a subjective observer or to an objective ob-
server?97 And, if the court looks to an objective observer, who is the "rea-
sonable person" the court should use in this analysis? These same questions
apply to the effects prong of the Lemon test, because that analysis mirrors
an endorsement test analysis. 9
8
A. Justice O'Connor's Standards ofAnalysis
At the same time as she introduced the endorsement test, Justice
O'Connor also considered and defined the appropriate analytical perspec-
tive. Further, she defined her "reasonable person," focusing on the objec-
tive perspective of the community and also giving credence to the
subjective perspective of the government when analyzing Lemon's purpose
prong. Through this objective lens, she defined her reasonable person con-
sistent with the reasonable person defined in tort law.
1. Using an Objective and a Subjective Perspective
When Justice O'Connor first introduced her endorsement test in Lynch
v. Donnelly, she considered the question of whose perspective should con-
trol. 99 She said the meaning of a statement to its audience depended on
both the intention of the speakerlOO and on the "objective" meaning of the
statement to the community.' 0' Justice O'Connor argued that some observ-
ers could discern the intent of a display by examining the context in which
it appears, while other observers would instead rely on what the city stated
as its reason for the placement of the display. 102 Therefore, it would be
necessary to examine both the objective and subjective components of the
message being communicated in order to determine whether an inappropri-
ate meaning existed.1 03
96. Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 371.
97. Id.
98. Freethought Soc 'v, 334 F.3d at 269.
99. See 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. In Lynch, the speaker was the city of Pawtucket that placed a creche in its holiday display. Id.
101. The people in the city of Pawtucket, viewing the creche, were the "community" whose under-
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Justice O'Conner looked at both an objective and subjective analysis.
She argued that under Lemon's purpose prong, the proper inquiry should be
whether the government intended to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion-a subjective examination. 104 However, even if this
step passed constitutional muster, it was still necessary to determine the
effect that the government's practice had on the community at large-an
objective examination.10 5 And, only practices having the effect of commu-
nicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion,
either intentionally or unintentionally, would be relevant. 106 Thus, although
Justice O'Connor used both an objective and subjective perspective in her
analysis, the constitutionality of a government's actions truly depended on
the objective perspective of the community.
Further weight was given to the importance of the perspective of the
objective observer in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree.
In that case, Justice O'Connor again stated that the relevant issue was
whether an objective observer would perceive a state endorsement of relig-
ion. 107 And later, in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,
Justice O'Connor stated that the endorsement test should not focus on the
perception of individual observers, but should instead look to the objective
meaning of the government's statement to the community. 108 The question
should not be whether there is any person who would find an endorsement
of religion; the question should be whether a reasonable person would per-
ceive a governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion. 0 9
2. The More-than-Reasonable Person
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test calls for an objective observer,
whom this Note defines as the more-than-reasonable person. It is this ficti-
tious individual's perceptions that the endorsement test uses in determining
whether there has been an Establishment Clause violation. Justice
O'Connor asks whether a "reasonable observer"--one who is familiar with
the text, legislative history, and implementation of a display-would con-
sider that display to be a governmental endorsement of religion." I 0
104. Id. at 691. This examination is subjective because it looks to the intent of the government
alone and does not consider the interpretation of a message by the community.
105. Id. at 692.
106. Id.
107. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
108. 515 U.S- 753, 779 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
109. Id.
110. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Justice O'Connor extensively defined her "reasonable person" in the
1995 case Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, equating
her standard to the standard used in tort law.1 1' She argued that because her
endorsement test created an objective standard for analyzing the meaning
of governmental statements and displays, it was comparable to the reason-
able person used in tort law.1 12 This person, she stated, "is not to be identi-
fied with any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable
things, but is rather a personification of a community ideal of reasonable
behavior, determined by the collective social judgment." 113 She argued that
when she chose a hypothetical observer who was presumed to possess a
level of knowledge that all citizens may not share, she was simply ac-
knowledging the reality that there will always be some person who will
perceive an endorsement of religion, and that such an individual's views
should not control.'1 4 In an effort to make sure that one particular viewer's
observations would not control, Justice O'Connor made her reasonable
observer an individual who was aware of the history and context of the
community and of the forum in which a religious display appears.'
15
3. The Fault in Justice O'Connor's Standards
Most people who view religious displays in public forums "will not be
aware of the history of the community and forum to the degree [Justice]
O'Connor assumes for her reasonable person."' 1 6 In reality, most people
will perceive an endorsement of religion in situations where Justice
O'Connor's more-than-reasonable person would not. 117 A true reasonable
person, as this Note will prove, will only have an ordinary amount of
knowledge of the law and history encompassed in a display.l" 8 In Estab-
lishment Clause cases-where the crucial concern is the actual perception
of the objective observer--"Justices should not impute to 'reasonable peo-
ple' a knowledge of legal and political matters that far exceeds that of ordi-
nary people." 1 9 Justice O'Connor misinterprets the reasonable person
111. 515 U.S. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
112. Id.at779.
113. Id. at 779-80 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra
note 22, at 175).
114. Id. at 780. Justice O'Connor further explained that her adoption of the hypothetical observer
with a heightened level of knowledge did not mean that she was choosing to consider the perceptions of
the majority of people in a community over lone nonadherents. Id.
115. Id.
116. Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 372 (emphasis in original).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 374.
119. Id.
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standard in tort law. Thus, a close examination of what the tort law stan-
dard actually is highlights the flaws in Justice O'Connor's more-than-
reasonable person.
B. The Objective Observer as the Accepted Standard in Tort Law
In determining whether a governmental endorsement of religion may
be perceived to exist, the first question to ask is, whose perceptions should
be used?120 If a subjective perspective of any given citizen's perception
was used, the result would be "governmental paralysis" because there
would always be at least one citizen who sees the government's position as
either endorsement or disapproval of a religion. 121 Instead, by adopting the
objective perspective of the "reasonable observer," a potential Establish-
ment Clause violation can be examined through a more neutral lens.
The use of an objective observer to determine Establishment Clause
violations is not a new concept. Tort law, for example, uses this same ob-
jective analysis. Section 283 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that the standard of the reasonable man is one "which the community de-
mands must be an objective and external one, rather than that of the indi-
vidual judgment, good or bad.... It must be the same for all persons, since
the law can have no favorites."' 122 One of the frequently mentioned ration-
ales for favoring this objective perspective lies in administrative conven-
ience. 123 For example, there would be many administrative expenses in
trying to assess the differing mental capacities, skills, and views of differ-
ent individuals. 124 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., supported the use of the
objective perspective, stating that:
[One rationale is] the impossibility [or difficulty] of nicely measuring a
man's powers and limitations.... But a more satisfactory explanation is
that, when men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice
of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to
the general welfare. 125
As the law of torts demonstrates, Justice O'Connor was correct in fo-
cusing on an objective perspective in her endorsement test. Although the
government's purpose should still be ascertained, the importance of how
120. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 291 (1987).
121. Id.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965).
123. Richard W. Wright, Negligence in the Courts: Introduction and Commentary, 77 CHil.-KENT
L. REV. 425, 466-67 (2002).
124. Id. at 467.
125. Id. at 468 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 86 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881)).
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the objective observer perceives the display should control. Tort law tells
us that it would make sense to apply an objective perspective consistently
throughout an entire Establishment Clause analysis, thus also considering
whether an objective observer would see a secular purpose. With this
proper perspective thus established, the next question becomes, who is the
objective observer?
C. Who is the "reasonable person"?
The objective observer is described as a reasonable observer. But, who
is this reasonable person? According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
"[tihe reasonable man is a fictitious person, who is never negligent, and
whose conduct is always up to standard. He is not to be identified with any
real person."'126 He is an individual with ordinary mental and physical ca-
pacities and skills. 127 The qualities of a reasonable man that are important
differ with the various situations in which this standard is applied.128 Such
flexibility is important because it allows the reasonable observer to be
molded to fit a given situation, but this is precisely the problem under Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence. Because courts are able to craft their
reasonable observer in different manners depending on the facts of a case,
there is inconsistency amongst the circuits regarding when the Establish-
ment Clause has been violated. 129 And, as this analysis of the Third Cir-
cuit's decision will show, there is both a proper and improper way to define
the reasonable person in the Establishment Clause context.
IV. APPLYING THE REASONABLE PERSON AS THE OBJECTIVE OBSERVER
IN FREETHO UGHT SOCIETY V CHESTER COUNTY
The Third Circuit's holding in Freethought Society v. Chester County
is erroneous for several reasons. First, the court did not properly apply an
objective perspective in analyzing the existence of a legitimate secular
purpose for displaying the Ten Commandments plaque. It only looked to
the subjective perspective of the 2001 County Commissioners. Second, the
use of Justice O'Connor's more-than-reasonable person as the objective
observer was improper. This standard assumes too much of the average
community member in Chester County. And third, even if the more-than-
reasonable person perspective had been correct, the court did not apply the
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 122, § 283 cmt. c.
127. Wright, supra note 123, at 466.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 122, § 283 cmt. d.
129. See supra note 4.
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standard uniformly so as to reach a proper conclusion. Instead, it selec-
tively chose specific historical facts of which its reasonable person would
be aware.
A. The Third Circuit's Failure to Consistently Apply the Perspective of
the Objective Observer
One of the Third Circuit's conclusions was that Chester County had a
legitimate secular purpose in refusing to remove the Ten Commandments
plaque. 130 The County Commissioners believed that the plaque formed
much of the basis of American law and polity, and this subjective perspec-
tive was adopted by the court for legitimizing a governmental secular pur-
pose.131 However, the Third Circuit admitted that it did not consider
whether a reasonable, objective observer would have reached this same
conclusion. 132 It never questioned whether an objective observer would
believe the Ten Commandments plaque was celebrating a foundational
legal document. 133 Instead, the court simply ignored the issue.
Although courts typically defer to the government in identifying the
secular purpose of a religious display, courts should not entirely discount
whether the community-whom the objective observer should represent-
would be able to identify this purported secular purpose. The Third Circuit
stated that it expressed no opinion regarding what an objective inquiry into
the secular purpose of the plaque would reveal. 134 This omission in analysis
only weakens the credibility of the court's conclusion. Justice O'Connor
has stated that while the subjective perspective of the government may be
considered, the heart of the existence of an Establishment Clause violation
lies in the effect a display has on the objective observer. 135 So, for the
Third Circuit to exclude such an analysis is contrary to judicial precedent.
B. The More-than-Reasonable Person: An Unrealistic Expectation
Where the Third Circuit did look to the perceptions of the objective
observer, it improperly applied Justice O'Connor's more-than-reasonable
person standard. The court adopted her view that a reasonable observer is
130. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 268 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that "it
appears [the Commissioners] honestly believed [the plaque] served the secular purpose of demonstrat-





135. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
presumed to be knowledgeable regarding the general history of a display
and of the community in which the display appears. 136 Thus, the "reason-
able observer" is more knowledgeable than an uninformed passerby.
137
However, this heightened knowledge requirement is not the correct stan-
dard. It is not a fair and accurate representation of the regular citizen. The
goal in looking through the lens of the objective, reasonable person is to
determine how the Ten Commandments plaque will be perceived by the
average community member. It is presumptuous to assume that such an
individual will be aware of the historical implications of the plaque. The
court, by applying a more-than-reasonable person standard, actually re-
verted back to a partially subjective standard. It started moving away from
the community ideal-what the average community member is knowledge-
able of-and toward the overly knowledgeable citizen as its "objective"
observer.
The court's conclusions under the endorsement test, and thus under
the effects prong of Lemon, are erroneous because of the Third Circuit's
use of the more-than-reasonable person standard. Its conclusions were: (1)
the "reasonable observer" would be aware of the approximate age of the
plaque and the fact that Chester County has not highlighted its existence
since its erection; (2) the "reasonable observer" would believe the plaque
itself was historic because of its age and its placement on a historic Court-
house; and (3) the "reasonable observer" would believe the County's inac-
tion to remove the plaque was due to its desire to preserve a longstanding
plaque and not to endorse religion.1 38 If a true reasonable person standard,
comparable to that in tort law, had been applied, these conclusions could
not have been reached.
1. The Age of the Ten Commandments Plaque
All of the Third Circuit's conclusions are premised on a more-than-
reasonable person who has a higher level of knowledge regarding the his-
tory of the Ten Commandments plaque and the history of the Chester
County Courthouse. However, the court confesses that "the age of the Ten
Commandments plaque is not obvious from viewing the plaque itself."'
139
The court thus acknowledges that its reasonable observer had to know more
than was discernible by simply looking at the plaque. And, even if the
plaque appears older than the administrative signs near it, this appearance
136. FreethoughtSoc'y, 334 F.3d at 259.
137. Id,
138. Id at251.
139, Id. at 254.
[Vol 80:981
2005] DEFINING REASONABLENESS: THE MORE-THAN-REASONABLE PERSON 1001
does not necessarily result in a conclusion that the plaque must be old
enough to carry a historical significance that detracts from its religious text.
Also, there is no reason to assume that the average community member is
aware of every action the County has taken in the past eighty years. To say
that a community member would know that the plaque had never been
celebrated in any manner is to assume the people of Chester County pos-
sess a level of knowledge that they very likely do not. Therefore, the
court's first conclusion-that the "reasonable observer" would be aware of
the approximate age of the plaque and that Chester County had done noth-
ing to highlight or celebrate that plaque in the last eighty years---cannot be
supported when a true reasonable person standard is applied.
2. Historical Significance of the Ten Commandments Plaque
The court's second conclusion, that the reasonable observer would be-
lieve the plaque was historically important, also fails when a more-than-
reasonable person standard is not applied. Knowledge that the Chester
County Courthouse is historically significant, having a place on the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places, is not something the common population
would necessarily be aware of. Although there is a small plaque affixed to
the Courthouse stating that the building has been placed on the National
Register of Historic Places, that plaque, like the Ten Commandments
plaque, is located on the east side of the Courthouse, away from the main
entrance to the building. 140 Because the only portion of text on the Ten
Commandments plaque that passersby can read from a distance is the title,
"The Commandments,"'14 1 people walking by the Courthouse would not be
able to read the smaller plaque noting the historical significance of the
Courthouse. The reasonable person is presumed to have ordinary mental
and physical capacities, 142 and such ordinary capacities surely do not entail
an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of a County Courthouse and the
religious plaque affixed thereon.
3. The County's Refusal to Remove the Plaque
By establishing that the Third Circuit's first two conclusions would
fail when an appropriate reasonable person standard is applied, it becomes
more clear that the court's third conclusion is speculative at best. The rea-
sonable person, who is not necessarily knowledgeable of the plaque's his-
140. Id.
141. Id. at 253.
142. Wright, supra note 123, at 466.
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torical significance, would have no reason to conclude that Chester
County's refusal to remove a plaque that offended certain community
members was the result of a desire to preserve a longstanding historical
display. It seems more likely that the community would perceive the
County's inaction as an endorsement of a religious text that offended cer-
tain community members.
C. The More-than-Reasonable Person Would Have Perceived the Ten
Commandments Plaque as a Governmental Endorsement of Religion in
Violation of the Establishment Clause
Even if the Third Circuit had been correct in applying the perspective
of the more-than-reasonable person, it did not apply this standard consis-
tently. The court seems to have selectively applied its more-than-
reasonable person standard, only according knowledge of certain historical
facts to the objective observer. If the court found the correct analysis to be
Justice O'Connor's more-than-reasonable person, then it should have uni-
formly applied that standard and taken into consideration all of the facts
that this overly-knowledgeable observer would have.
The court states that a "reasonable person" would be aware of the age
of the Ten Commandments plaque. If this were true, then that person
should also be aware of the context in which the plaque was erected in
1920. He or she should be aware that the plaque was donated by the Reli-
gious Education Council-a group comprised solely of clergy and laymen
of Protestant denominations. 143 He or she should be aware that at the dedi-
cation ceremony, a prayer was given and a hymn was sung.144 And, he or
she should be aware that the keynote speaker preached, "Have you remem-
bered the Sabbath Day to keep it holy? If you disobey the commandments
here and escape punishment, there is yet the punishment which will surely
be meted out on the day of judgment."'
145
Also, the court concluded that the "reasonable observer" would be-
lieve the plaque was historic because of its placement on an historic Court-
house. However, if the "reasonable observer" knows the history of the
Chester County Courthouse, he or she also knows that when the application
for placing the Courthouse on the National Register of Historic Places was
submitted, there was no mention of the Ten Commandments plaque.
1 46
143. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 191 F. Supp. 2d 589, 590 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
144. Id.
145. FreethoughtSocy, 334 F.3d at 251.
146. Id. at 253.
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Thus, the "reasonable person" would conclude that the plaque does not
hold the same historical significance as the Courthouse itself.
The more-than-reasonable person should possess knowledge that
would lead him or her to conclude that the Ten Commandments Plaque on
the Chester County Courthouse is a governmental endorsement of religion
in violation of the Establishment Clause. The 1920 dedication of the plaque
constituted the County's endorsement of a religious text, and therefore the
Commissioners' 2001 refusal to remove the plaque cannot be seen as a
desire to maintain the existence of a secular symbol. The Commissioners'
inaction can only be seen as an attempt to keep a religious symbol affixed
to a governmental building.
D. The Ten Commandments Plaque-An Establishment Clause Violation
The reasonable observer-unaware of the history of either the Ten
Commandments plaque or the Chester County Courthouse-would view
this plaque as the government's endorsement of a Protestant perspective of
a religious text. Also, even if the reasonable observer were aware of the
plaque's history, he or she would still conclude that the plaque was an en-
dorsement of religion. The Ten Commandments plaque is the only signifi-
cant display on the Chester County Courthouse. Although there are smaller
signs, such as a no-skateboarding sign and a historic certification plaque, 147
there are no other displays of great consequence, such as the Declaration of
Independence or the Bill of Rights. A display solely featuring the Ten
Commandments is much less likely to be perceived as having a secular
purpose compared to a display where other secular symbols are also
present. 148
The Supreme Court has held that the Ten Commandments are unde-
niably a sacred religious text, "and no legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact.' 49 The Commandments are not
confined to strictly secular matters. Rather, they begin by commenting on
the religious duties of believers, including "worshipping the Lord God
alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord's name in vain, and observing
the Sabbath Day."' 50
It does not matter that in this case the Ten Commandments plaque was
funded solely by a private organization, with no governmental support. As
147. Id. at 254.
148. See Adland v. Russ, 307 F3d 471, 482 (6th Cir. 2002).
149. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
150. Id. at 42 (citing Exodus 20: 1-11; Deuteronomy 5: 6-15).
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the Supreme Court has noted, the mere posting of copies of the Ten Com-
mandments by the legislature constitutes official support by the state gov-
ernment, in violation of the Establishment Clause. 15 1 Here, the Chester
County Commissioners allowed a plaque of the Ten Commandments to be
placed on the County Courthouse in 1920 and then refused to remove the
plaque in 2001, even after learning that community members found it
offensive.
Because the context in the Freethought case does not change the in-
herently religious message that the Ten Commandments possess, the
plaque does constitute a governmental endorsement of religion, violating
the Establishment Clause.
E. Persuasive Authority Holds that Ten Commandments Displays Violate
the Establishment Clause
Although judicial decisions of other appellate courts are not control-
ling on the Third Circuit, they are still worthy of consideration. Prior to the
Third Circuit's decision, both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits heard cases
considering whether displays of the Ten Commandments on governmental
property were violative of the Establishment Clause, and both courts con-
cluded that these displays constituted governmental endorsement of relig-
ion.152 The Third Circuit distinguished both of these cases because neither
addressed the argument that history could provide a context affecting the
perceptions of the reasonable observer.153 However, the historical context
of the Ten Commandments plaque in West Chester, Pennsylvania, is not
enough to prevent the reasonable observer from perceiving the plaque as a
governmental endorsement of religion.
In Adland v. Russ, the Sixth Circuit held that a monument of the Ten
Commandments could not be taken out of storage and placed on state capi-
tol grounds. 154 The court stated that "the Ten Commandments convey a
religious message, a message that cannot be diminished by a simple recita-
tion that the display is not for religious purposes."' 55 Although this case is
distinguishable because it involved the placement of a monument, it still
151. Id.
152. See Adland, 307 F.3d at 474-75 (holding that a monument of a nonsectarian version of the
Ten Commandments could not be placed on state capital grounds because it violated the Establishment
Clause); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a monument of
the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment Clause).
153. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2003).
154. Adland, 307 F.3d at 474-75,490.
155. Id. at 488.
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demonstrates the view of the Sixth Circuit that the Ten Commandments
contain an inherently religious message.
The Seventh Circuit, in Books v. City of Elkhart, held that a Ten
Commandments monument, displayed on the lawn in front of a local mu-
nicipal building, had the purpose and effect of endorsing religion. 156 The
court stated that "the history of the City's involvement in the placement of
this particular monument serves to emphasize a religious purpose in its
display.' 157 Also, an objective observer viewing the monument would see a
religious display placed at the center of the local government. And this
placement would cause a perception of governmental religious
endorsement.1 58
The Third Circuit was too quick in dismissing the holdings of the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits, especially regarding the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Books, where the monument had been in place since 1958. Al-
though this time frame does not span as far back as the Chester County
display's history, the Books monument's age would still seem to link the
cases enough for the Third Circuit to have addressed the Seventh Circuit's
decision more deliberately.
V. THE EFFECTS OF FREETHOUGHT ON THE FUTURE OF ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Since the Third Circuit's holding in Freethought, there have been sev-
eral decisions in other appellate courts, and a subsequent decision in the
Third Circuit itself, regarding Ten Commandments displays on government
property. 159 Two of these cases, both of which reference the Freethought
holding, were recently argued before the Supreme Court of the United
States.160 And, arguments for both cases included discussion of the percep-
tions of the reasonable observer.161
Although Freethought was not one of the cases heard by the Supreme
Court, its effects may still be felt because both of the cases that were heard
156. See Books, 235 F.3d at 302-04.
157. Id. at 303.
158. Id. at 306.
159. See supra note 4.
160. See ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 471 (6th Cir. 2003) (Ryan, J., dissent-
ing) (referencing Freethought for the proposition that a non-sham secular purpose offered by the county
commissioners was sufficient to show a secular purpose in displaying the Ten Commandments), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 310 (2004); Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Free-
thought for the proposition that the history of a display affects a viewer's perception of its meaning),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004); see also Linda Greenhouse, The Ten Commandments Reach the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A10.
161. See supra note 12.
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on certiorari referenced the Freethought decision, either in majority or
dissent. 162 In Van Orden v. Perry, the Fifth Circuit looked to the Third
Circuit's decision in Freethought to support its conclusion that the history
of a Ten Commandments display downplays the religious undertones of the
monument.163 At issue in Van Orden was a granite monument etched with
the text of the Ten Commandments that had sat on Texas State Capitol
grounds since 1961.164 The monument also contained depictions of ancient
Hebrew script, an American eagle, and two small Stars of David. 165 The
plaintiff in Van Orden argued that there was no legitimate secular purpose
for the display and that "a reasonable viewer would perceive the display of
the decalogue as a State advancement and endorsement of religion favoring
the Jewish and Christian faiths."'1 66 However, the court disagreed.
The Fifth Circuit quoted Freethought, stating that "[t]he reasonable
observer, knowing the age of the.., plaque, would regard the decision to
leave it in place as motivated, in significant part, by the desire to preserve a
longstanding plaque."' 167 The Fifth Circuit went on to hold that it was not
persuaded that "a reasonable viewer touring the Capitol and its grounds,
informed of its history and its placement, would conclude that the State
[was] endorsing the religious rather than the secular message of the deca-
logue."' 168 However, as this Note has argued, the conclusion of the Third
Circuit was erroneous and did not properly employ the reasonable person
analysis. 169 Therefore, it is unconvincing for the Fifth Circuit to argue that
a reasonable viewer would believe that a Ten Commandments display was
not an endorsement of religion, and it would be erroneous for the Supreme
Court to follow the Fifth Circuit's example and adopt the more-than-
reasonable person standard used in Freethought.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heid in
ACLU of Kentucky v. McCreary County that three displays of the Ten
162. See McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 471 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (referencing Freethought for the
proposition that a non-sham secular purpose offered by the county commissioners was sufficient to
show a secular purpose in displaying the Ten Commandments); Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 182 (quoting
Freethought for the proposition that the history of a display affects a viewer's perception of its mean-
ing).
163. Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 182.
164. Id. at 176.
165. Id. The monument also contained depictions of an eye inside a pyramid, which resembled the
symbol on a one-dollar bill, and a symbol representing Christ: the Greek letters Chi and Rho, superim-
posed on each other. Id.
166. Id. at 176-77.
167. Id. at 182.
168. Id.
169. See supra Part IV.
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Commandments did violate the Establishment Clause. 170 The displays were
located in three separate counties in Kentucky. 171 In two of the counties,
the displays were posted in county courthouse; in the third county, the dis-
plays appeared in local schools. 172 Seven individuals filed suit arguing that
the displays violated the Establishment Clause, and the Sixth Circuit found
that "[a] reasonable observer of the displays cannot connect the Ten Com-
mandments with a unifying historical or cultural theme that is also
secular."1
73
Although the majority did not cite the Third Circuit's decision in
Freethought, the dissenting opinion used Freethought as an example of an
appellate court finding that a Ten Commandments plaque did not violate
the Establishment Clause because the County Commissioners "believed
that the Ten Commandments contributed to the development of American
law."'174 The dissent pointed to a line of argument in Freethought that this
Note has demonstrated is flawed. 17 5 The Third Circuit's Freethought deci-
sion was erroneous because it only focused on the subjective perspective of
the County Commissioners, and it failed to consider whether the commu-
nity would agree that the Ten Commandments plaque was in fact a "sig-
nificant basis of American law and the American polity."'1 76 Again, as the
Supreme Court examines the McCreary case, it should not adopt the dis-
sent's rationale in as far as it follows the conclusions of the Third Circuit in
Freethought.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prohibit any law that re-
spects an establishment of religion. When analyzing potential Establish-
ment Clause violations, the "totality of circumstances" surrounding a
governmental action must be considered. 177 The development of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence has brought Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test into the purview of many courts' analyses. Thus, the role of the
reasonable person has become crucial. There is no justification for creating
a more-than-reasonable person as the objective observer to perceive poten-
170. 354 F.3d at 440.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 460.
174. Id. at 471 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
175. See supra Part IV.A.
176. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 267 (3d Cir. 2003).
177. Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 304 (7th Cir. 2000).
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tial Establishment Clause violations. Using this sort of person will inevita-
bly lead to improper conclusions of law.
In Freethought Society v. Chester County, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals applied this more-than-reasonable person standard and concluded
that a plaque of the Ten Commandments affixed to a county courthouse
was not a violation of the Establishment Clause.178 By applying the correct
reasonable person standard, it is easy to conclude that the Ten Command-
ments plaque is a violation of the Establishment Clause. A reasonable per-
son would not view the plaque on the Chester County Courthouse without
thinking that it was a governmental endorsement of religion. 179
The impact of the Third Circuit's decision in Freethought is now be-
ing felt as other appellate courts adopt or consider the Third Circuit's rea-
soning. What is clear is that "context matters" when considering
Establishment Clause violations. 180 But what remains unclear is the per-
spective from which that context is viewed and interpreted. The Supreme
Court will likely undertake a reasonable person analysis in ruling on the
Ten Commandments cases now before it.181 The Court should not follow
the standard of the Third Circuit by examining Ten Commandments dis-
plays through the lens of the more-than-reasonable person. However, if the
Court does adopt a more-than-reasonable person standard, it must make
clear that such a person should have knowledge of all significant historical
and contextual facts-not just those facts that help a court reach the con-
clusion it wishes. 182 The creation of a uniform reasonable person standard
would help bring an end to the discrepancy in Establishment Clause case
law and would bring clarity to this important area of constitutional law.
178. Freethought Soc 'y, 334 F.3d at 270.
179. See supra Part IV.B.
180. Greenhouse, supra note 160, at A 10.
181. The Supreme Court likely will consider the role of the reasonable observer in its analysis
because both parties in each case discussed the role of the reasonable observer in determining Estab-
lishment Clause violations. See supra note 12.
182. See Smith, supra note 120, at 292 (discussing how "a purely fictitious character will perceive
precisely as much, and only as much, as its author wants it to perceive; and there is no empirical touch-
stone or outside referent upon which a critic could rely to show that the author was wrong").
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